Scam messages are no longer reliably identified by poor spelling or an obviously fake logo. An attacker may copy a real conversation, compromise a genuine supplier account or use information from social media to make an urgent request sound credible.
People still matter, but the organisation should not make one hurried employee the only control between a convincing message and a serious loss.
Recognise the decision the attacker wants
Most scams try to create one of a few outcomes:
- reveal a password or MFA code;
- open a malicious attachment;
- approve a payment or change bank details;
- install software or grant remote access;
- share sensitive information; or
- bypass a normal process because the request appears urgent or confidential.
The message’s appearance matters less than the action it requests. An authentic-looking email can still ask for something that requires independent verification.
Verify through a separate route
If a supplier changes bank details, a director requests an unusual payment or a support caller asks for remote access, verify the request using contact information already held by the organisation.
Do not use the phone number or link supplied in the suspicious message. The NCSC similarly recommends contacting the organisation directly using details from its official site in its guidance on spotting cyber attacks .
For high-impact payments or account changes, require a second person to approve the action. This protects against both external scams and ordinary mistakes.
Do not amplify warnings without checking them
Well-intentioned hoax warnings can create unnecessary alarm, overload support teams and direct people towards unsafe instructions. Before forwarding a warning, check a trusted source such as the affected provider, the NCSC or an established security authority.
An internal reporting route is more useful than forwarding the message to everybody. It lets someone assess the claim and issue consistent advice if action is needed.
Make suspicious messages easier to report
Provide a clear reporting button or address and tell people what happens next. Encourage quick reporting even after a link has been clicked or information supplied.
The response should focus on limiting harm: reset exposed credentials, revoke sessions, contact the bank or supplier, isolate an affected device and preserve the message for investigation. Blame makes the next person less likely to report promptly.
Protect the accounts scammers target
Use MFA or passkeys for email and finance systems, remove unused accounts and monitor unexpected sign-ins or mailbox rules. Configure SPF, DKIM and DMARC to make direct impersonation of the organisation’s own domain harder.
Limit publicly available detail that helps an attacker construct a convincing request. Organisational charts, staff absences, supplier relationships and finance responsibilities can all provide useful context.
Design processes that remain safe under pressure
Write down the steps for changing bank details, releasing payments and granting remote access. The process should continue to apply when the request appears to come from a senior person.
Use realistic exercises to test the response, but do not treat training as an opportunity to catch people out. Measure whether reports arrive quickly and whether the organisation follows its verification process.
If something has already happened
Act quickly without improvising recklessly:
- Contact the bank or payment provider through a trusted route.
- Notify the organisation’s incident lead and IT support.
- Change affected credentials and revoke active sessions.
- Preserve the messages, payment details and relevant logs.
- Assess whether personal data or other organisations are affected.
- Use the appropriate fraud, cybercrime and regulatory reporting channels.
The strongest defence is not perfect suspicion. It is a process in which unusual, urgent and financially significant requests receive independent verification before the organisation acts.