The old advice was simple: create a complicated password, change it regularly and never write it down. In practice, that often produced predictable variations, reused credentials and passwords stored in unsafe places.
Modern account security is less about forcing people to remember more and more about combining several controls that each solve a different problem.
Start with the accounts that matter most
Not every login carries the same risk. Prioritise:
- business email;
- Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace administration;
- finance, payroll and banking;
- domain, website and DNS management;
- backup administration;
- remote-access services; and
- any account that can reset other passwords.
These accounts deserve the strongest available sign-in method and tightly controlled recovery options.
Use unique passwords without relying on memory
A password must not be reused across services. If one provider is breached, reused credentials allow an attacker to try the same combination elsewhere.
A reputable password manager makes unique credentials practical. It can generate passwords, fill them only on the corresponding site and share business credentials through controlled access rather than email or spreadsheets.
For organisational use, consider how the service handles account recovery, staff departures, emergency access, audit records and shared credentials. Protect the password manager itself with a strong, unique primary password and multi-factor authentication.
The NCSC recommends password managers and provides guidance on choosing and using them safely .
Turn on multi-factor authentication
Multi-factor authentication (MFA), also called two-step verification, requires another proof in addition to a password. It greatly reduces the usefulness of a stolen password.
Any MFA is generally better than none, but the methods are not equal. SMS codes can be useful where stronger methods are unavailable. Authenticator apps, security keys and device-bound methods can provide better protection. Administrative and other high-impact accounts should use the strongest practical option.
Recovery codes and fallback methods need the same care as the main sign-in process. Store them securely and remove obsolete phone numbers, devices and app registrations.
Adopt passkeys where they fit
Passkeys replace a reusable secret with cryptographic credentials held by a device or password manager. They are resistant to conventional phishing because the credential is tied to the legitimate service.
Before a broad rollout, establish:
- which devices and browsers are supported;
- whether credentials synchronise between approved devices;
- how a user recovers access after losing a device;
- how the organisation revokes access when someone leaves; and
- whether a password remains as a weaker fallback.
Passkeys reduce some risks, but they do not remove the need for device security, access reviews or reliable recovery procedures.
Separate routine and privileged access
Administrators should have a separate account for privileged work rather than using elevated access for email and web browsing. Shared administrator accounts make accountability and safe offboarding difficult.
Use the minimum access required, review privileged roles regularly and create a controlled emergency account for situations where the normal sign-in system is unavailable. Emergency access should be monitored and tested, not forgotten.
Make recovery part of the design
Attackers often target recovery routes because they are weaker than the main login. Review who controls recovery email addresses and phone numbers, how identity is verified, and whether a supplier’s support desk could be persuaded to reset an account.
Document the recovery process for critical services and test it without disabling a working account. The right time to discover that an ex-employee owns the recovery address is not during an incident.
A workable policy
A practical authentication policy can be concise:
- Use passkeys where the organisation supports them.
- Otherwise use unique passwords stored in the approved password manager.
- Require MFA for email, cloud services, administration, finance, backups and remote access.
- Do not share personal accounts.
- Remove access promptly and review privileged access regularly.
- Record and test recovery methods for critical accounts.
Good authentication should make secure behaviour easier. If the policy depends on everybody remembering dozens of complex secrets, the policy is working against the people expected to follow it.